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NOTES

arbitration could under the statutes be carried through and enforced
even if the other party were absent. It is very questionable, however, if it is desirable to permit a party to obtain a judgment without service on the other party in such cases. The possibility of the
misuse of such a statute to place an unwarranted burden upon an
adversary may well outweigh the hardship in some cases upon a
party wishing to go on with the arbitration. Indeed a provision
that judgment could be obtained against a non-resident party without service at any time would present a serious" constitutional question. It might be urged that this was consented to in advance by
the arbitration contract. But this would not be true when the
question in issue is the making of the contract.
On the whole, the amendment seems to be a desirable addition
to arbitration statutes modelled on the lines of the New York statute. Without it there is the possibility that a recalcitrant party
would be able to delay the arbitration or annoy his opponent by
merely refusing to go on, thus compelling the institution of court
proceedings. It is true that an order might be obtained by a summary method. Yet some time is necessarily consumed, especially
when a jury trial is demanded. The fact that a party willing to
proceed is required to take the initiative is burdensome. Furthermore, the sometimes difficult question whether a party has merely
failed to appear or whether
he has actually withdrawn from the
7
arbitration is avoided
Although the amendment may be good in its general purpose,
the drafters of similar amendments in other jurisdictions may profit
by the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case. It should be
expressly provided that a party continuing with the arbitration under
protest should be permitted subsequently to attack the authority
of the tribunal. It should be made clear that the objecting party
may apply for a determination of the validity of the contract of
arbitration, the power of the arbitrators, etc., pending the arbitration proceedings. Some thought should be given to the question
whether it would be advisable to give a court discretionary power
on the application of an objecting party to stay the arbitration
proceedings pending a judicial determination of jurisdiction and
similar matters.
HAROLD C. HAVIGHURST.
EVIDENCE-FAILURE

OF A PARTY

To

TESTIFY-IPLIED

AD-

MISSION-PRIVILEGE.-[Connecticut] A case' recently decided by
the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut suggests several inter-

esting problems. The action was brought by the administrator of
a woman who had been struck and killed by an automobile driven
by the defendant. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident, which
occurred while the deceased was crossing the street at the regular

17. The question whether this makes any difference is suggested supra,
note 3.
1. Kotler v. Lalley, (Conn. 1930) 151 At. 433.
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crossing. The defendant had admitted the fact that his car struck
the deceased; but he did not testify at the trial. At the close of the
very scant evidence for the plaintiff, the trial court directed a nonsuit, and the appeal presented the question whether the case should
have been submitted to the jury-i. e., whether there was evidence
warranting a finding of negligence on the part of the defendant
and freedom from contributory negligence on the part of the
deceased.
In discussing the first of these problems the court observed:
"A review of the evidence leads us to the conclusion that the jury
might reasonably and logically have found the defendant negligent.
We think the trial court failed to accord the force which the law gives
to the conduct of the defendant and the inferences and presumptions
legally created thereby."
Then, after discussing the fact that the defendant did not stop
after the accident, which had been treated in State v. Ford2 as an
implied admission, the court proceeded:
"In that case [State v. Ford] as in this, the defendant failed to
take the stand to explain the occurrence, and we said, (page 497 of 109
Conn., 146 A. 828), and now affirm, that: 'The privilege of refraining
from testifying, if he so elects, does not protect him from any unfavorable inferences which may be drawn by his triers from his exercise of
the privilege'." The court was obviously speaking of the privilege against selfincrimination, since the common law3 privilege of a party to a civil
action not to testify for the adverse party had been abolished by
statute4 in Connecticut.
While the point has not often arisen, the ruling seems sound
enough, that the privilege against self-incrimination does not protect
a party to a civil action from what otherwise would be proper adverse inferences from his exercise of the privilege. That privilege
is designed to protect him from forced disclosure of matter that
might be used to his prejudice in a criminal prosecution, and not
to protect him from civil5 liability.
Whether the same rule should be applied to a defendant exercising his privilege when he ,is prosecuted on a criminal charge, as the
same court had ruled in the case 6 referred to in its opinion, is a
much more doubtful problem. If the matter is viewed on a purely
technical basis, the allowance of adverse inference from an exercise
of the privilege does not technically force the defendant to testify,
or be a witness against himself. He has perfect freedom to choose
between the two evils.
2. (1929). 109 'Conn. 490.
3. Rex v. Inhabitants of Woburn (1808) 10 East 395; Ben oist v. DarbV

(1848) 12 Mo. 196.
4. Gen. Stat. Conn. Rev. 1918. Sec. 5741.
5. Morris v. McClellan (1908), 154 Ala. 639.

6. State v. Ford (1929), 109 Conn. 490.
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But such a rule does make the privilege of silence practically
worthless in all cases where his testimony would not be more damaging than a presumption or inference of guilt from silence. In the
case of other privileges, such as that for communications between
attorney and client, it is generally held that the policy on which the
privilege is based precludes 7 adverse inference from its exercise.
This view was thus expounded by Lord Chelmsford in the Wentworth case:
"The exclusion of such evidence is for the general interest of the
community, and therefore to say that when a party refuses to permit
professional confidences to be broken, everything must be taken most
strongly against him, what is it but to deny him the protection which,
for public purposes, the law affords him, and take away a privilege which
can thus only be asserted to his prejudice."
The same view has been taken of the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination by courts that thought that the Constitution laid down a broad policy of protection which should not be
stripped of its value by legalistic reasoning. 8 On the other hand,
the courts of Maine and New Jersey seem to have taken the view
that the privilege should be restricted9 to the narrowest limits
possible.
In many states the statutes seem to foreclose all question in the
criminal cases by prohibiting comment or presumption from the
defendant's failure to testify. 10 The Connecticut statute prohibited
comment, but the court in the Ford case held that this did not prohibit adverse inferences. It is certainly an innovation to be told that
a jury may properly consider matters which can not be discussed by
counsel.
The English courts have held that a statute, prohibiting comment by the prosecution on the failure of a defendant to testify, did
not preclude comment by the judge." According to this reasoning
it might be urged that a statute, like that of Illinois, declaring that
the failure of the defendant to testify should not create any presumption against him, would not make it improper for the jury to
draw inferences of fact from such silence, since there are differences
between a presumption and an inference.
In fact in one case' 2 the Supreme court apparently adopted that
7. Wentworth v.Lloyd (1664), 10 H. L. Cas. 589; Pennwylvania R. R.
Co. v. Durkee (1906), 147 Fed. 99.
8. People v. Tyler (1869), 36 Cal. 522; State v. Pavelich (1928), 150

Wash. 411.

9. State v. Bartlett (1867), 55 Me. 200; Parker v. State (1898), 61 N. J.

L. 308.
10. The Illinois statute is a good *example. Ch. 38 sec. 734. SmithHurd's Ill. Rev. Stats., 1925: "Provided, however, that defendant in any
criminal case or proceeding shall only at his own request be deemed a competent witness, and his neglect to testify shall not create any presumption
against him, nor shall the court permit any reference or comment to be
made to or upon the subject.
11. Queen v. Rhodes [1899] 1 Q. B. 77.
12. Raffel v. United States (1926), 271 U. S.494.
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view. The federal statute 3 provides that the failure of the defendant to testify shall not create a presumption against him, but the
court held that a defendant who testifies on a second trial of his
case might, for the purpose of affecting his credibility, be crossexamined by the judge as to his failure to testify on the first trial.
This indicates that in the opinion of the court the jury were at
liberty to draw unfavorable inferences as to the truth of his testimony from privileged and seemingly protected silence on the former
trial.
These variant rulings mean that courts treat the constitutional
privileges against self-incrimination and the supplementary legislation on that subject liberally or strictly according to their own
views of sound policy.
But there is another problem quite independent of any question
of privilege, and that is, whether the failure of a party to take the
stand on his own behalf should be the subject of adverse inference
in the absence of special circumstances.
There are a great many cases, which need not be cited, laying
down broadly, subject to a few limitations, that the failure of a
party to take the stand on his own behalf is the proper subject of
adverse inference. The only limitations suggested are that a prima
facie case must have been made against him, and the matter must
be apparently within his knowledge. One court, at least, has rejected
this rule on the ground of policy.14 In the Ward case the court

quotes with approval the following passage from the opinion of
Justice Bleckley in Thompson v. Davitte:
"We think, on the contrary, that it is becoming, and to be commended, in a party not to testify, if he can avoid it without positive
injury to the cause of truth and justice. As long as he is unheard,
there should be no presumption that his silence is counseled by prudence rather than modesty. While his case should not gain by his
forbearance to testify, neither should it lose by it. Public policy forbids that a suitor should feel constrained to mount the witness stand
for no purpose but to let the jury know that he has something to say
in his favor, or to show that he can face the terrors of cross-examination without breaking down. The encouragement of anything like competition in swearing would be sure to breed perjury. Let those testify
in their own behalf who voluntarily present themselves; but let no
uncharitable imaginations light upon those who stay away, merely because they might swear if they would."
According to the writer's observation of many trials, there is
no less danger of perjury today from competition in swearing then,
there was when Justice Bleckley wrote.
The theory in support of the prevailing rule is that of an admission implied from silence. At best constructive or implied admissions are troublesome and unsatisfactory. The failure to deny or
explain an adverse statement may, of course, be due to the fact
13. 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 632.
14. Thonpson v. Dazitte (1877), 59 Ga. 472, approved in Ward v. Morris (1922), 153 Ga. 421, at 425.
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that the party can not truthfully deny or explain, and is unwilling
to lie. If that is really the case, there is a true admission. But silence
may be due to various other causes, and, in that event, is not an
admission at all. In that case, if treated as an admission, it is
given a probative force which it ought not to have. The inherent
difficulty is that generally there is no way of determining the true
reason for the silence, and we do not know enough about human
behavior under various conditions to apply a theory of probability.
For example, on arrest for some charge, the prisoner fails to
deny or offer an explanation. This may be due to the fact that he
has none to offer, or to the fact that he does not think it would do
any good, or to the fact that he wishes legal advice before making
any statement. Since there is no way of determining the true explanation, silence there is not usually admitted as an implied admission. 5
A person receives a letter from a stranger making some demand
on him or asserting some claim against him, and fails to answer it.
Such failure may be due to the fact that he can not truthfully dispute the charge, or to the fact that he does not feel called on to
notice it. Again since there is no way of determining the true explanation of the silence, the failure to answer such a letter is not
received as an implied admission. 6
On the other hand, A has a regular charge account with B, and
fails to make any objection to the monthly statement sent to him.
Under thbse
conditions his 'failure to object is received as an implied
1
admission. "
We doubtless know enough about behavior under these conditions to say that most persons do object to erroneous bills, so that
we have fair ground for concluding that the failure to objdct has
real significance. A party takes the stand and testifies in his own
behalf, but fails to deny or explain some adverse testimony about
which he clearly has personal knowledge. In such a case his silence
is the subject of comment and inference. 18
Here again general experience is probably sufficient to enable
us to conclude that the party could not truthfully deny or explain.
If the instances noted indicate the true basis of implied admissions
from silence, then to justify the evidential use of a party's failure
to take the stand on his own behalf general observation and experience must indicate that in a majority of instances, absent unusual
circumstances, the failure is due to his inability to deny or explain.
If we have no such basis in experience and observation, then
there is no rational ground for treating the silence as an implied
admission. It will not do to say, "I would take the stand to deny or
explain if I could," and therefore this man's failure to deny or
explain means his inability to do so. That is a hypothetical case,
not an actual one.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Comm. v. Kenney (1847) 12 Metc. (Mass.) 235.
Leach v. Pierson (1927) 275 U. S. 120.
Wiggins v. Burkham (1869) 10 Wall. (U. S.) 129.
Caminetti v. United States (1917) 242 U. S. 470.
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Inability to deny may be the true explanation in some cases,
but every lawyer knows that it is rarely the unwillingness of the
client to testify that keeps him off the stand. The attorney decides,
as a rule, whether his client is to take the stand, and the reasons
which influence the attorney are many. He knows that juries are
apt to discount the testimony of an interested party, and he may
wish to prevent the opposing attorney from harping on the interest
of the party as detracting from his credibility, and thus distract
attention from disinterested testimony. The client may have an
unfortunate personality or manner which may make a bad impression and do more harm than any possible benefit from his testimony.
A cross-examination to discredit is full of possibilities for
prejudice, though it may have little bearing on real credibility.
Such considerations frequently lead the attorney to keep his client
off the stand, and the judges of the appellate courts know it, if they
have not forgotten their experience as trial lawyers. One is led
to suspect, however, that the unconscious position of the judges has
been something like this: "I would take the stand to deny adverse
testimony if it wasn't true." Therefore if this defendant does not
take the stand it must be because he can not deny.
To the writer this assumption seems unwarranted, and results
in a rule that may work undue hardship, without compensating
advantages.
E. W. HINTON.
TRuSTS-VALIDITY

OF

PRIVATE

TRUSTS-CERTAINTY.-[Illi-

nois] In Spaulding v. Lackey' the will provided that trustees,
named, should use the residue of rents and income in keeping up
the family cemetery for a period of twenty years from the testator's
death, or, if the wife survived him, for twenty years from her
death, at which time the trustees were to convert all the properties
of the estate into cash and expend the moneys in building a roadway, the route of which was specifically described, but the selection
and choice of the material of which it was to be constructed, were
left to the trustees.
The bill was brought by those nominated as trustees for their
appointment as such and for directions. The chancellor denied the
prayer of the bill and this action the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the attempted trust was void. Using the court's own language, the reason for the decision was:
"The entire fund to be derived from the conversion of the estate
into money as directed . . . , can be applied by the trustees in the construction of the proposed road over private property and for a purely
private purpose, and in that event nothing will be left for the improvement of those portions of the public highway which constitute the
remainders of the route specified by the testator. If the trustees possess
1. (1930)

340 Ill. 572.

